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[ Original Paper ] | |
Journal of Advanced Marine Engineering and Technology - Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 235-251 | |
Abbreviation: JAMET | |
ISSN: 2234-7925 (Print) 2765-4796 (Online) | |
Print publication date 31 Aug 2024 | |
Received 05 Jun 2024 Revised 17 Jul 2024 Accepted 15 Aug 2024 | |
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5916/jamet.2024.48.4.235 | |
Lightning risks and mitigation solutions for vessels | |
Franco D’Alessandro†
| |
Correspondence to : †Chief Technology Officer, Lightning Protection International Pty Ltd, 49 Patriarch Drive, Huntingfield, Tasmania, 7055, Australia, E-mail: fdalessandro@lpi.com.au, Tel: +61 3 6281 2461 | |
Copyright © The Korean Society of Marine Engineering This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0), which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. | |
The risk of economic loss, loss of human life, and permanent and serious injuries due to lightning strikes is prevalent across all industries and market sectors. Recreational, commercial and defence vessels and their occupants are no different except that, in some cases, these vessels are in remote locations on the sea where failures and fires from lightning strikes can seriously compromise safety onboard or be catastrophic. This paper provides a unique quantitative analysis of the risks posed by lightning on vessels, vessel assets, and their personnel. The methodology used is based on the risk calculations described in lightning protection standards, adapted to the special features of vessels. The paper describes the physical damage that is known to occur when lightning strikes vessels directly or indirectly and then provides a comprehensive mitigation approach that can be used to minimise losses due to lightning. This four-step mitigation approach comprises direct-strike protection, surge protection, earthing and bonding, and personal protection (for situations where personnel are at risk). A generic and practical lightning protection solution is provided for all types of vessels using some of the outcomes of the latest international research on lightning protection and extensive experience over many years.
Keywords: Lightning risk, Lightning damage, Lightning protection, Vessels, Maritime safety |
Thousands of thunderstorms are in progress at any given time throughout the world, resulting in tens of millions of lightning strikes to Earth each year [1]. Climate change modelling shows that global lightning activity is predicted to increase by about 12% for every degree of rise in global average air temperature [2], so the frequency and severity of thunderstorms is also in-creasing.
Whilst total lightning activity over bodies of water (oceans, lakes and rivers) is typically less than the activity over the same area of land, there are several aspects of thunderstorms over wa-ter that make lightning extremely dangerous. For example:
In point (a), the measure of “intensity” depends on the method of observation, e.g., optical vs radio sensors at ELF, VLF, and VHF. However, lightning flashes over oceans have larger cur-rents, longer durations, and are brighter than flashes over land [4]. Also, Holzworth et al. [7] found “superbolts” with energies that are 3σ above the mean occur predominantly over oceans.
In point (b) and leading into point (c), unlike structures on land, any vessel on water presents as a very likely strike point in a thunderstorm due to its electric field enhancement with little “competition” from adjacent points. When lightning enters a ves-sel, it tries to find a low-impedance path to the water. Hence, it will damage whatever comes between it and the water.
Damage commonly seen in lightning strikes to vessels include:
Of course, personnel safety is also compromised because there is a risk of death or serious injury.
With regard to point (d), interactions between ships and at-mospheric electricity have been observed and recorded for thou-sands of years. However, Thornton et al. [6] analysed 12 years of high-resolution global lightning stroke data from the World-wide Lightning Location Network (WWLLN) and found that lightning strike density is enhanced by up to a factor of two di-rectly over shipping lanes in the northeastern Indian Ocean and the South China Sea in comparison to adjacent areas with similar climatological characteristics. These authors hypothesised that the increase is due to emissions of aerosol particles.
In a recent study, Petersen [8] has expressed a contrasting hy-pothesis regarding the lightning enhancement found by Thornton et al. [6], namely that tall objects in high electric field environ-ments are known to initiate lightning. Hence, the alternate expla-nation for the lightning enhancement is that tall, well-grounded ships may be facilitating lightning production – particularly in storms that are near the tipping point between remaining “electri-fied shower clouds” and becoming thunderstorms.
Regardless of which hypothesis is more likely, the fact remains that lightning activity along shipping lanes is double what it would be for similar but relatively unnavigated waters. This fact implies that the risk of a lightning incident is double what it would normally be over water.
The main points and research addressed in the remainder of this paper are (i) the author’s quantitative lightning risk analysis for vessels and their personnel, using a tailored approach that combines traditional methods presented in standards as well as newer methods, (ii) a review of the type and extent of damage that occurs on vessels as a result of lightning strikes, and (iii) a step-by-step outline of a systematic lightning protection strategy to mitigate the risks and losses due to lightning.
The aim of this section of the paper is to present some calcula-tions of the risks posed by lightning when vessels encounter or operate in thunderstorms. Lightning is an external electrical haz-ard that adds to the common electrical accidents and incidents that can occur due to internal electrical faults on vessels. A simple event tree diagram of the hazards posed by lightning on vessels is shown in Figure 1. On this basis, the paper emphasises the need to assess and mitigate the risks associated with lightning strikes to ensure the safety of vessels and their occupants.
Much of the equipment in vessels at sea is critical. Damage to this equipment due to lightning strikes can lead to the loss of electrical power supply, propulsion, and navigation control. The paper underscores the severe risks posed by fire hazards result-ing from arcing and sparking events on vessels, which can be triggered by lightning strikes. Navigation accidents can occur, since steering, navigation radar, fire pumps, and engine controls are highly critical equipment that are sensitive to electrical surges. Lightning is a common cause of such effects, hence the im-portance of dealing with it appropriately. Critical equipment onboard cannot usually be substituted, so once it catches fire, total loss of vessel control and an accident becomes inevitable.
Despite the importance of assessing lightning risks to vessels, there is limited availability of published literature on lightning risks specific to vessels. Hence, more research and analysis are needed in this area to better understand and address lightning risks in the maritime industry. However, Nicolopoulou et al. [9] have undertaken such a study. These authors calculated the ex-pected number of lightning strikes on three ship models with comparative application of various lightning attachment models and stroke current distributions. They found that, in coastal areas, a ship is expected to be struck by lightning approximately every two years. These authors also proposed a new method for light-ning protection of critical masts on ships that combines a shield-ing analysis procedure and a statistical lightning interception model. This aspect will be addressed in Section 4 of the paper.
The scarcity of literature on this topic emphasises the im-portance of assessing lightning risks to vessels due to the critical nature of onboard equipment and the potential catastrophic con-sequences of lightning-induced accidents. Proper assessment and mitigation of lightning risks are crucial for maintaining operation-al efficiency and ensuring the safety of personnel onboard ves-sels.
The lightning risk study needs to encompass a practical range of vessel sizes (and heights) and allow for the wide range of lightning activity encountered around the world.
Table 1 shows the range of vessel dimensions included in the lightning risk study. Separate risk calculations will be made for each vessel category in Table 1.
Vessel Type | L (m) | W (m) | H (m) |
---|---|---|---|
Small recreational boat | 10 | 3 | 3 |
Sailing yacht (maxi) | 30 | 5 | 45 |
Superyacht | 50 | 10 | 20 |
Navy / Coastguard Patrol Boat | 60 | 10 | 25 |
Navy Frigate | 120 | 15 | 35 |
Navy Destroyer | 150 | 20 | 55 |
Navy Amphibious Assault Ship | 230 | 30 | 65 |
Small Cruise Ship | 80 | 15 | 15 |
Cargo (Handymax) | 150 | 30 | 30 |
Cargo (Bulk Carrier / Tanker) & Large Cruise Ship | 300 | 40 | 60 |
Lightning activity is typically expressed as a “ground flash density” (GFD), in units of ground flashes per square km per year. GFD over land ranges from about 0.5 to more than 30 flashes/km2/yr. A NASA map of world lightning activity is shown in Figure 2.
Mackerras et al. [1] estimated that the ratio of the mean global land-to-ocean total flash density is about 3.4. Hence, a reasonable range of GFD for lightning over bodies of water or oceans is 0.1 to 10 flashes/km2/yr. This range will be used for the lightning risk analysis. Note that lightning activity in littoral (shoreline / coastal) areas is likely to be somewhere between the land and ocean values.
A “first-principles analysis” can be used to estimate the light-ning “collection area” (Ae) of the vessels listed in Table 1. The simple principles outlined in lightning protection standards [10][11] can be used for this purpose. However, additional meth-ods will also be used for comparison purposes.
In simple terms, the risk estimate can utilise the “3H rule” per the above standards if the “structure” can be approximated by known dimensions with an equivalent height. For an isolated, “equivalent rectangular structure” of length L, width W, and height H (in metres) on flat ground (but in the present study, “on the water”), the lightning collection area is given by:
(1) |
For a ground flash density (GFD), the number of cloud-to-ground lightning flashes per year (ND) in a given collection area is given by:
(2) |
Note that this:
A more fundamental way in which to determine exposure area is via the use of the “striking distance” (ds) or “attractive radius” (Ra) of the vessel. Hence, additional calculations will also be performed using this concept and the results compared with the 3H rule.
The rolling sphere method (RSM) described in standards [10] [11] can be used to obtain the striking distance, which comes from an empirical formula describing the simple “electrogeomet-ric model” (EGM), namely:
(3) |
where Ip is the prospective lightning stroke current (which, in turn, is related to the charge on the downward leader).
On the other hand, the more analytical and rigorous studies of researchers, e.g., [12]-[16], readily provide estimates of the at-tractive radius. The Rizk [14]-[16] formula for a structure height H is given by:
(4) |
In the analysis that follows, the simple EGM and the Rizk formulae will be used to estimate collection area.
In general, formulae such as those above require the lightning stroke current. The use of a median stroke current (around 30 kA) is not representative of the complete log-normal distribution of stroke current amplitudes. Hence, a representative value of the stroke current must be based on the integral of the probability density function for the current amplitudes to give the probabil-ity-weighted average collection area. Such an analysis was car-ried out in [17]. It was found that the mean (weighted) stroke current is approximately 40 kA. Consequently, 40 kA will be used in the EGM calculation. Note that the Rizk formula already considers the probability density function of stroke currents, so this parameter is not needed for direct input into Equation (4).
Tables 2 and 3 present the results of the lightning incidence calculations made for the different vessels listed in Table 1, using the simple 3H, EGM and Rizk methods. As can be seen, different methods give different results, with no clear trend to choose just one method. Given these variations, the mean value of all three methods was used to progress to the probability calculations.
Vessel Type | Lightning Incidence Range (flashes/yr) | ||
---|---|---|---|
3H Rule | EGM | Rizk | |
Small recreational boat | 0.0001 – 0.0052 | 0.0038 – 0.3800 | 0.0006 – 0.0605 |
Sailing yacht (maxi) | 0.0067 – 0.6686 | 0.0038 – 0.3800 | 0.0081 – 0.8144 |
Superyacht | 0.0019 – 0.1901 | 0.0038 – 0.3800 | 0.0037 – 0.3739 |
Navy / Coastguard Patrol Boat | 0.0029 – 0.2877 | 0.0038 – 0.3800 | 0.0046 – 0.4632 |
Navy Frigate | 0.0065 – 0.6479 | 0.0038 – 0.3800 | 0.0064 – 0.6398 |
Navy Destroyer | 0.0145 – 1.4463 | 0.0038 – 0.3800 | 0.0099 – 0.9874 |
Navy Amphibious Assault Ship | 0.0228 – 2.2776 | 0.0038 – 0.3800 | 0.0116 – 1.1592 |
Small Cruise Ship | 0.0016 – 0.1611 | 0.0038 – 0.3800 | 0.0028 – 0.2837 |
Cargo (Handymax) | 0.0062 – 0.6235 | 0.0038 – 0.3800 | 0.0055 – 0.5518 |
Cargo (Bulk Carrier / Tanker) & Large Cruise Ship | 0.0236 – 2.3619 | 0.0038 – 0.3800 | 0.0107 – 1.0734 |
Vessel Type | MTBF Range (yrs) |
---|---|
Small recreational boat | 673 – 6.7 |
Sailing yacht (maxi) | 161 – 1.6 |
Superyacht | 318 – 3.2 |
Navy / Coastguard Patrol Boat | 265 – 2.7 |
Navy Frigate | 180 – 1.8 |
Navy Destroyer | 107 – 1.1 |
Navy Amphibious Assault Ship | 79 – 0.8 |
Small Cruise Ship | 364 – 3.6 |
Cargo (Handymax) | 193 – 1.9 |
Cargo (Bulk Carrier / Tanker) & Large Cruise Ship | 79 – 0.8 |
Table 3 shows the mean time between flashes to the range of vessel categories included in the risk analysis. Generally speak-ing, direct strikes to vessels can be expected once every year to few years in higher lightning areas, and once every hundred to several years for low lightning areas.
The previous section quantified the likelihood of lightning flashes to vessels. Attention now turns to the consequences of those strikes. Broadly speaking, lightning can cause equipment / operational / economic damage and can even start fires, particu-larly but not limited to vessels carrying flammable or explosive materials. These aspects are addressed in Section 3 of the paper. In this and the next sub-section of the paper, the focus will be on personnel hazards due to lightning strikes.
The probability of occurrence of a potentially hazardous light-ning incident involving a person on a vessel is given by:
(5) |
where Pincident is the probability of an incident that may involve a person during a thunderstorm, Pstrike is the probability of a direct lightning flash to the vessel and Pexposure is the probability that someone will be in an exposed or dangerous position at the in-stant of a lightning flash to the area.
The values for Pstrike for the vessel have already been obtained (see Table 2). These values are based on 24 hours-per-day, 365 days-per-year collective exposure to lightning.
The values for Pexposure are based on behavioural patterns that may vary during a 24-hour period or from day to day. The worst-case scenario would be personnel exposure on a vessel for 24 hours-per-day, 365 days-per-year, but this extreme may not be realistic. Hence, 50% of this exposure time is assumed for the probability calculations.
The probability calculations are shown in Table 4.
Vessel Type | Pstrike (yr-1) | Pexposure | Pincident (yr-1) |
---|---|---|---|
Small recreational boat | 0.0015 – 0.1486 | 0.5000 | 0.0007 – 0.0743 |
Sailing yacht (maxi) | 0.0062 – 0.6210 | 0.5000 | 0.0031 – 0.3105 |
Superyacht | 0.0031 – 0.3147 | 0.5000 | 0.0016 – 0.1573 |
Navy / Coastguard Patrol Boat | 0.0038 – 0.3770 | 0.5000 | 0.0019 – 0.1885 |
Navy Frigate | 0.0056 – 0.5559 | 0.5000 | 0.0028 – 0.2780 |
Navy Destroyer | 0.0094 – 0.9379 | 0.5000 | 0.0047 – 0.4690 |
Navy Amphibious Assault Ship | 0.0127 – 1.2723 | 0.5000 | 0.0064 – 0.6361 |
Small Cruise Ship | 0.0027 – 0.2749 | 0.5000 | 0.0014 – 0.1375 |
Cargo (Handymax) | 0.0052 – 0.5184 | 0.5000 | 0.0026 – 0.2592 |
Cargo (Bulk Carrier / Tanker) & Large Cruise Ship | 0.0127 – 1.2718 | 0.5000 | 0.0064 – 0.6359 |
According to IEC 62305-2 [10], the risk component related to injury of human beings, RA, is given by:
(6) |
where:
If an ALARP risk approach is taken, then the maximum prob-ability for PA must be used, i.e., 1.0. On the other hand, lower values can be used if justified, e.g., where extensive lightning protection measures are provided. In this analysis, it will be as-sumed that no lightning protection measures are in place.
With regard to ND and LA, the probability calculations in Table 4 have already taken into account the former and part of the latter (via the exposure time). However, LA is more rigorously defined as follows:
(7) |
where rt is a “loss reduction factor” that depends on the type of soil or flooring, LT is the is the typical mean percentage of per-sons injured by a lightning flash, and tz is the time in hours per year for which the persons are present in the area of interest.
Standards [10][11] suggest a value of 0.01 for LTif the person is in some form of structure or shelter when the incident occurs. For people on the deck of a vessel, this scenario is not applicable. Such people may also be adjacent to a structural element of the vessel and hence at risk of a side-flash. The exact value to use in this case is difficult to estimate as the international literature, ob-viously, tends to focus on deaths and injuries rather than, for example, “near misses” with no injuries. However, according to Ritenour et al. [20], up to 80% of people involved in a lightning incident receive some form of injury. Hence, a conservative value of 0.8 will be used.
With regard to rt, Table C.3 from IEC 62305-2 [10] is used, where the value of rt ranges from 10–2 for the most conductive surfaces to 10–5 for materials with a high voltage withstand. As personnel on vessels will often be standing on metallic surfaces, a value of 10–2 must be used.
Individual (single person) risks were computed using the guidelines above. These risks are shown in Table 5, noting that they are all “per person” risks. Hence, for N people exposed to lightning, the risks in Table 5 should be multiplied by N.
Vessel Type | Risk Range for Individuals (yr-1) |
---|---|
Small recreational boat | 5.94 x 10-6 - 5.94 x 10-4 |
Sailing yacht (maxi) | 2.48 x 10-5 - 2.48 x 10-3 |
Superyacht | 1.26 x 10-5 - 1.26 x 10-3 |
Navy / Coastguard Patrol Boat | 1.51 x 10-5 - 1.51 x 10-3 |
Navy Frigate | 2.22 x 10-5 - 2.22 x 10-3 |
Navy Destroyer | 3.75 x 10-5 - 3.75 x 10-3 |
Navy Amphibious Assault Ship | 5.09 x 10-5 - 5.09 x 10-3 |
Small Cruise Ship | 1.10 x 10-5 - 1.10 x 10-3 |
Cargo (Handymax) | 2.07 x 10-5 - 2.07 x 10-3 |
Cargo (Bulk Carrier / Tanker) & Large Cruise Ship | 5.09 x 10-5 - 5.09 x 10-3 |
Standards [10][11] typically nominate 1.0 x 10–5 yr-1 as a “tol-erable” lightning risk for loss of human life or serious injury. Comparing this value with the calculations summarised in Table 5, the personnel risk is seen to be intolerable for the majority of vessel types across the range of typical lightning activity en-countered over bodies of water.
Apart from the personnel risks on vessels due to lightning as calculated in Section 2, structural elements of vessels and sensi-tive and/or critical equipment onboard can be damaged in light-ning storms. Such incidents can pose serious consequences for operational integrity and safety at sea. Furthermore, the magni-tude of charge or current delivered by a lightning strike can lead to fires onboard, especially if explosive or flammable materials are being transported. Such fires can be uncontrollable out at sea, e.g., if fire-fighting equipment is out of service after the strike.
Aside from structural damage to prominent items such as masts, towers, bridges, antennas, tanks, and hulls, typical items of critical equipment on vessels that can be damaged by direct (full or partial) lightning currents and induced surges from the extreme electromagnetic field of the return stroke(s) of a nearby lightning flash include:
Such equipment operates at relatively low voltages and hence any surge or “overvoltage” in the electrical lines connecting to them can cause severe damage. Even if there is no damage, surg-es can result in errors in communication signals that subsequently cause operational problems or pose risks to navigation safety.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is very little published (public) information available on insurance claims and statistics around lightning damage to vessels. According to BoatUS*, an analysis of 10 years of marine insurance claims on smaller vessels has revealed which ones are most at risk. They found that more light-ning damage occurred to taller vessels than lower ones, e.g., sailboats have significantly more lightning claims than power-boats (ranging from 0.1 to 6.9 damage claims out of every in 1000 boats). Also, larger boats have more lightning claims than smaller ones (6 per 1000 boats in the 12-20 m class). Importantly, almost all of the insurance claims included damaged electronics. This aspect is discussed further in Section 3.3.
In terms of the losses in the smaller vessel category addressed above, Salway [21] states that lightning has a big impact on mod-ern watercraft. Losses that used to be around US$250,000 are now approaching US$1 million due to the sophisticated electron-ics and equipment aboard. This author states that “as an industry, we are experiencing strikes in regions where we haven’t seen them before”.
Analysis of insurance industry loss data by Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty [22] uncovered 1269 claims from light-ning strikes in the marine and aviation† transportation sector over a 5-year period. The cost of damage claims was around €110 million.
As stated by Nicolopoulou et al. [23], even though metallic vessels have been deemed to be somewhat “self-protecting” due to the conductive nature of the hull, electrical equipment within the vessel is subjected to extremely high values of electromagnet-ic radiated field and to portions of the injected lightning current. Hence, the “surge immunity” of naval equipment is essential for the reliable operation, e.g., of vital communication and navigation systems. For vessels with non-metallic hulls, the electromagnetic environment is even more harsh when lightning strikes the vessel.
In both cases above, lightning does not have to strike the ves-sel directly to impose large surges (or “lightning induced over-voltages”) on the conductive lines connecting equipment within the vessel. The frequency of these “indirect strikes”, i.e., those striking the water nearby or a land object when the vessel is docked, is much higher than direct strikes. Hence, the probability of damage to vulnerable equipment is even higher than the risks to personnel that were calculated in Section 2.5.
Nicolopoulou et al. [23] carried out a computational study on a full-scale, metal-hulled bulk carrier struck by lightning. They simulated the direct strike with a standardised, first negative lightning stroke of 100 kA with a waveshape of 1/200 μs and allowed computation of the electromagnetic field of the lightning channel with a “perfect electric conductor” model. These authors modelled a realistic electric network within the vessel, including loads such as lighting, navigation and control equipment, com-munications, propulsion, etc.
It was found that the induced overvoltages at the bridge equipment exceed the withstand voltage of the equipment, i.e., equipment would likely be damaged without protection. Whilst some shielding of the electromagnetic field was seen below deck, conducted overvoltages were found to be transferred into the interior of the hull in some locations.
In summary, equipment at positions close to openings, such as the bridge control room, is severely exposed to the lightning electromagnetic field and to the highest values of overvoltages across the interior of the hull structure. Furthermore, cases of external cable routes such as coaxial cables of antenna masts and cable shields bonded to the hull are subject to direct conduction of the lightning current that results in the withstand voltage of the equipment being exceeded. Nicolopoulou et al. [23] conclude that the use of shielded cables and the proper installation of surge protection devices (SPDs) are the most efficient methods to pre-vent the consequences of a lightning strike within the electric network of a vessel.
Earlier sections of the paper have described the risks posed by lightning to personnel and marine vessels. In most cases, the lightning risks are intolerable, so mitigation measures need to be put into place.
This section of the paper briefly describes the historical devel-opments behind the protection of marine vessels, provides a ge-neric, comprehensive, four-step approach to lightning protection, and then focuses on the specific lightning protection measures needed on marine vessels to mitigate the risks to tolerable levels.
Benjamin Franklin is recognised as the inventor of the light-ning rod in 1752. According to Bernstein & Reynolds [24], soon after Franklin’s invention, a lightning protection system was devised for ships of the Royal Navy which used a chain conduc-tor draped into the sea from the top of the mast. This system had only limited success because the chain, raised only when light-ning was expected, often was not in place when lightning struck, it interfered with personnel manning the rigging, and was not capable of conducting some lightning strokes without damage to itself or the ship.
In Great Britain, around 220 Royal Navy ships were lost or damaged by lightning strikes during the Napoleonic wars of 1803 to 1815. In 1820, Harris [25] invented a system of fixed lightning conductor plates which were routed along the aft side of the mast down through the hull to the copper sheathing on the bottom of the ship. He spent the next two decades trying to per-suade the British Admiralty to test his system and require its installation. Harris faced old prejudices, notions of economy, and bureaucratic suspicions of technological innovation. It took a successful trial installation on eleven ships, an extensive cam-paign by Harris to publicise the extent of lightning damage to the navy, the favourable recommendations of two study committees, and administrative changes in the Admiralty before the Royal Navy finally adopted his approach in 1842. In contracts, by this time, the Imperial Russian Navy had already adopted the pro-posed lightning protection system.
However, to put everything into perspective, very little pro-gress was made in understanding the properties of lightning until the late 19th century, which is when photography and spectro-scopic tools became available as diagnostic tools in lightning research [26]. The work of Wilson in England in 1916, and Schonland et al in South Africa in the 1930s, kicked off the 20th century international research on lightning. Since that time, a lot more has been learnt about the characteristics and effects of light-ning and how to mitigate it. These studies are still continuing today.
This section of the paper describes proven measures to reduce asset and personnel risks due to lightning strikes. Note that it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of loss due to light-ning and this is why there are internationally accepted “tolerable risk” values. However, a large reduction in the risk can be achieved via a systematic and comprehensive approach to light-ning protection that considers the major damage mechanisms and potential losses due to lightning.
At an overview level, the conceptual graphic shown in Figure 3 summarises the comprehensive approach that needs to be taken to minimise losses due to lightning. This approach is comprised of four key steps:
This approach is applicable across all industry sectors, e.g., ag-riculture, aviation, marine, commercial, industrial, and recreation-al buildings and facilities, cultural, defence, mining, petrochemi-cal / oil & gas, power & renewables, communications, transporta-tion and utilities. It is applicable to any system, structure (includ-ing vessels), site or facility in which maintaining operational efficiency, minimising losses, and keeping personnel safe is nec-essary or important.
The remainder of this section provides more details on each step as it applies to vessels.
Step I involves the capture of lightning strikes with “air termi-nals” (sometimes called “lightning rods” or “air terminations”). Air terminals must be strategically positioned at high-risk points to minimise the possibility of lightning bypass, a process some-times called “shielding”. Some of the key points in Step I include:
(8) |
Step II is required to mitigate overvoltages, surges and transi-ents due to lightning, as discussed in Section 3.3. Such overvolt-ages can damage or destroy primary and secondary electrical / electronic equipment within a vessel. This so-called “surge pro-tection” is achieved via the use of “surge protection devices” (SPDs).
There are many aspects to consider with the application of SPDs. A brief summary of the main aspects of this vast topic includes the following key points:
Step III is fundamental to the overall lightning protection scheme as it minimises “earth potential rise” (EPR) effects and hence helps to prevent fires and other damage due to sparking. However, this step is where vessels differ greatly from most other applications. Underneath the vessel exists a body of water (fresh or saline) that can act as a very good “earthing system” without the huge variation seen in ground- or soil-based earthing outcomes as a result of the large variation in soil resistivity.
Therefore, the key to good earthing on vessels is to ensure that all lightning downconductor paths are directly bonded to metallic items in contact with the water at all times. This task is relatively easy to achieve in vessels with metallic hulls, whereas vessels with non-metallic hulls require the installation of one or more dedicated “earth plates” under the hull‡.
Rigorous equipotential bonding is also necessary, particularly for a non-isolated lightning protection system where the vessel is electrified by the lightning strike. Bonding is primarily a voltage consideration and is accomplished successfully by connecting all conductive elements together to a single point of reference in a “star network” arrangement. Bonding should be carried out using suitable conductor sizes (typically 35 – 50 mm2) and connections. The bonding path must be kept as short as possible so that a damaging voltage differential does not exist between the end of the bonding conductor and other conductive components within the vessel.
Step IV is the important task of protecting people (crew, pas-sengers, etc. hereafter called “personnel”) against lightning strikes. Much has been written about the effects of lightning on human beings, e.g., [18][28]. There are four main electrical mechanisms associated with lightning strikes that make cause injury or death to human beings, namely a:
The effects of these electrical mechanisms include burns to the skin, damage to various bodily organs and systems, uncon-sciousness, and death.
The lightning effects outlined above can be reduced dramatical-ly via the installation of a properly designed lightning protection system by following the four steps in this paper. However, it is very difficult to protect personnel from all lightning hazards. Hence, ideally, no personnel should be out on deck / in the open during a thunderstorm, i.e., administrative / procedural controls should be used. According to AS 1768 [11], to the extent con-sistent with safe handling and navigation of the vessel during a lightning storm, personnel should:
Even with a lightning protection system in place, avoiding con-tact with metallic items is very important. As shown by Nicolopoulou et al. [29] with electromagnetic simulations of lightning strikes to a ship, touch voltages as high as 19 kV were found in the bridge area of the ship. These authors explained that the dissipation of the lightning current on the ship’s surface caus-es voltage rise of the hull which acts as the ground reference level for the ship’s electric grid and development of dangerous step and touch voltages.
There are also three main non-electrical mechanisms that can cause serious human injuries, namely:
Once again, these hazards are avoided by remaining inside the closed vessel, although appropriate PPE can also lower the risks.
In the next section, some practical solutions are presented for addressing the risks and hazards outlined in the four steps above.
In summary, the comprehensive, four-step lightning protection plan recommended in this paper requires consideration and im-plementation of (i) direct-strike protection, (iii) surge protection, and (iii) earthing and bonding, with (iv) personal protection as an additional factor in any situations where personnel are at risk.
Within Step (i), there are two aspects to capturing lightning strikes reliably, namely (a) the methodology used for positioning air terminals, and (b) the air terminal “hardware” used. Both as-pects require further explanation before a practical solution can be presented for direct-strike protection – see Subsections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. Finally, Subsection 4.3.3 presents a proven, effective solu-tion for protecting vessels against lightning strikes.
The “rolling sphere method” (RSM) is commonly used for po-sitioning air terminals on structures [10][11]. It implements the simple “electrogeometric model” (EGM). To apply the RSM to vessels, an imaginary sphere with a radius equal to the striking distance calculated from the EGM, typically 45 metres, is rolled over the vessel in 3D. All surface contact points are deemed to require protection, whilst the unaffected surfaces and volumes are deemed to be protected.
The advantage of the RSM is that it is conceptually simple, even for application to vessels with complicated shapes. Howev-er, since it is a simplification of the physical process of lightning attachment to a vessel, it has some limitations. The main limita-tion is that it assigns an equal upward leader initiation and light-ning attachment probability to all contact points on the vessel, i.e., no account is taken of the role of electric field enhancement in upward leader initiation. Furthermore, when the RSM is applied to a vessel of height greater than the selected sphere radius, the sphere touches all parts of the vertical sides of the vessel struc-tures above a height equal to the sphere radius.
The limitations of the RSM have led many researchers to de-velop improved lightning attachment models for air terminal placement, e.g.,
All of these models have “leader propagation” at their heart, i.e., allow for the propagation of upward and downward leaders.
Referring specifically to vessels, Cvjetković et al. [38] state that most vessels are “non-conventional” structures, particularly under the dynamic conditions of rolling, pitching and swinging. They assert that existing “standardised methods are insufficient and do not provide the required level of safety”. These authors also proposed the use of a lightning strike warning system on board the vessel, where the crew could be alerted in real time. This suggestion fits in well with mitigation of the personnel risks discussed in Section 2 of this paper.
Hossam-Eldin & Omran [39] presented a technique to use the Collection Volume Method (CVM) for the placement of conven-tional or non-conventional lightning protection systems on ves-sels. These authors made calculations that included the vessel height and dimensions, radius of curvature, location, risk factors, and lightning parameters. They applied the method to a range of vessels, i.e., medium-sized war, cargo, destroyer, and aircraft carrier. They showed the method to be a very efficient means for lightning protection of vessels.
Hossam-Eldin & Abdalla [40] also published a new concept for lightning protection of vessels, using a “leader potential con-cept”. This method is based on a publication by Mazur & Ruhn-ke [41] that suggested striking distance can be estimated from the potential of the downward lightning leader. This transfer of con-cept in [40] resulted in lightning protection systems that were the least conservative (or most efficient) when compared to the RSM and CVM when applied to a warship, frigate, destroyer, aircraft carrier and cargo vessel. However, their analysis did not consider upward leaders. Out of the three methods they compared, only CVM takes the upward leader into account.
Fortunately, the work of Rizk [35]-[37] solves the above defi-ciency. Rizk’s “leader inception theory” (LIT) uses the concept of space potential and considers both the downward and upward leaders in the lightning attachment process. The LIT is universal-ly applicable, i.e., can deal with lightning protection problems in power systems, ordinary buildings, vessels, etc.
In summary, improved lightning attachment models have been applied successfully to direct-strike protection of vessels. Hence, there is no need to rely solely upon the RSM.
During a thunderstorm, the electric field between the thunder-cloud and the vessel (and surrounding water) is at highly elevated levels. Under such conditions, “corona discharge” emanates from many points on a vessel, as well as from any air terminals in-stalled for lightning protection, during the so-called “pre-strike phase of the storm. Historically, this effect was seen commonly on sailing ships and was called “St Elmo’s Fire” [42].
In terms of lightning protection, corona discharge results in the development of a space charge “volume” or “cloud” above the object(s) [43]. Sharp-tipped air terminals are well known to pro-duce substantially more corona space charge than blunt-tipped air terminals [44][45]. There is now significant theoretical and ex-perimental evidence that space charge accumulation around the top of an air terminal has a detrimental effect on its ability to initi-ate and sustain an upward leader [46]-[49][36][50]-[56]. The outcome of this space charge effect is that lightning capture is much less reliable because it affects the ability of the air terminal to launch the continuous, uninhibited upward leader that is need-ed for reliable interception of the downward lightning leader.
Hence, the most basic fact about lightning protection is that is far better to install optimised air terminals at the most likely strike point(s) on the vessel. The correct placement of air terminals is achieved with a suitable lightning attachment model as described in Subsection 4.3.1, preferably a modern leader propagation model that can account for the variables and parameters involved in the lightning attachment process e.g., D’Alessandro et al. [31]-[32][45], Rizk [35]-[37].
The most important optimised parameter is the geometry of the air terminal. This aspect was first studied systematically by Moore [46] and more recently by other researchers [55][56]. The optimum air terminal is one that is corona minimising during the pre-strike phase of a thunderstorm but, upon the initial descent of the downward leader, commences the corona-streamer-leader process in a dynamic response that leads to a continuously prop-agating upward leader and ultimate interception of the downward leader. Calculations of corona onset for given air terminal shapes rely on basic gas discharge physics [57] and calculations of the optimum air terminal geometry for practical installations are also achievable [58][59].
All of the above concepts and research are described in more detail in D’Alessandro [60].
A comprehensive lightning protection approach for vessels can be formulated from all the principles outlined in earlier sections of this paper. The generic concept for this approach is illustrated in Figure 4.
Capture of lightning strikes at a prominent location (deter-mined by the design methodology) is with one or more corona minimising air terminals, e.g., “Guardian CAT” or “Guardian Plus” [45]. The reasons for utilising this technology were ex-plained in Section 4.3.2. The remainder of the direct-strike sys-tem implements “protection by isolation”. This approach is a very effective for protecting vessels, i.e., discharge the lightning cur-rent into the water without electrification of any parts of the ves-sel.
The use of at least 2 metres of FRP mast together with an insu-lated lightning downconductor cable with an impulse withstand voltage of at least 500 kV [61] provides the necessary insulation and prevention of electrification of the vessel. This “HVSC Plus” cable minimises the risk of side flashes, a common problem with downconductors carrying fast rising lightning currents. Such incidents must be prevented on vessels because the arc flash can lead to a fire or blast in the nearby area, causing fatalities and losses.
A “lightning strike recorder” (LSR) may also be installed if in-formation about the lightning strikes captured by the system is required. This information may include parameters such as date and time, size of strike (peak current), etc. and may be accessible remotely for convenience and keeping maintenance costs to a minimum.
Figure 5 is a photo of a typical direct-strike installation on a vessel.
(b) Surge Protection
Surge protection must be applied to all valuable and critical equipment on vessels. Such equipment has an incoming power line as well as data / signal / control lines, depending on their function. All of these lines may carry surges into the equipment and damage or destroy it, hence they all need appropriately se-lected surge protection devices (SPDs). For power lines, the choices depend on single- vs three-phase SPDs, shunt vs series, type of electrical system, etc.
Hence, the surge protection requirements of every vessel are different. They depend upon the size, function and nature of the vessel. A common example of power line protection is the DIN Rail-mounted 3DR100KA-385-NE100 surge protection setup. The same components are also available in a compact “power protection module”, e.g., 3PPM100kA-385-NE100-AIMCB, allowing easier installation in many cases.
“Smart SPDs” are now available that allow monitoring of key physical parameters and provide easier indication methods for when SPDs need to be replaced. Further details on surge protec-tion generally, and smart SPDs particularly, can be found in D’Alessandro [27].
Figure 6 is a photo of a typical surge protection installation for power lines.
(c) Earthing and Bonding
The earthing and bonding arrangements of a vessel will also vary per the size, function, and nature of the vessel. Earthing is the final point of contact where the lightning strike safely dissi-pates into the water, whilst bonding conductors and connections ensure that lightning currents are controlled and dissipated into the water. Bonding conductors should have sufficient cross-section areas to ensure the full or partial lightning currents can be carried safely. The cross-sectional area typically varies from around 16 mm2 to 50 mm2 [11][62].
Figure 4 shows an earth plate (in green) under a vessel as a standard method of earthing for vessels with non-metallic vessel hulls. For vessels with metallic hulls, the hull provides a very good earth plane. It is important to ensure direct bonding ar-rangements for all equipment, SPDs and conductive elements occur to a common point on the hull.
(d) Personal Protection
In Section 2.5, it was concluded that personnel risk is seen to be intolerable for the majority of vessel types across the range of typical lightning activity encountered over bodies of water. The best risk reduction measure is elimination, i.e., personnel on ves-sels are not outside in thunderstorms.
The problem with elimination is the decision-making around when shelter should be sought. This decision is best made with a “lightning warning system” (LWS), as also pointed out by Cvjetković et al. [38]. A LWS that detects all phases of a thun-derstorm and provides a warning based on the magnitude of the atmospheric electric field is highly recommended.
It is recognised that elimination of risk may not always be pos-sible. If this is the case, personnel should be wearing full PPE, which includes:
Furthermore, contact with any conductive elements of the ves-sel must be avoided.
This paper has investigated the risk of asset and operational losses, as well as loss of human life, on vessels due to lightning storms. Such losses have even more serious consequences than land-based losses due to the remote locations of vessels, com-promising safety onboard.
A detailed quantitative analysis of the risks posed by lightning to vessels and their personnel was carried out. It was found that the mean time between flashes to the range of vessel categories investigated is once every year to few years in higher lightning areas, and once every hundred to several years for low lightning areas. Hence, the risk of a lightning strike to a vessel cannot be ignored. Furthermore, the risk to personnel was to be intolerable for the majority of vessel types across the range of typical light-ning activity encountered over bodies of water.
The paper then described the physical damage that is known to occur when lightning strikes vessels directly or indirectly and a comprehensive lightning mitigation approach was presented. This four-step approach is comprised of direct-strike protection, surge protection, earthing and bonding, and personal protection.
A generic and practical lightning protection solution was pro-vided for vessels using some of the outcomes of the latest inter-national research on lightning protection. This solution is appli-cable to all types of vessels, i.e., it has no dependence on the material of the hull, size of the vessel, type of electrical systems on board, etc. However, the specific details and material require-ments will depend on the above variables.
With the increasing sensitivity of equipment and the im-portance of human life, lightning protection of vessels is essen-tial. With appropriate measures in place, safer and more efficient vessel operations can be ensured.
F. D’Alessandro: Writing – original draft, Visualization, Validation, Project administration, Methodology, Investigation, Formal analysis, Data curation, Conceptualization.
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